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Abstract 
 
The fire that erupted in Grenfell Tower in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea in west 
London on 14 June 2017 is widely acknowledged to be the worst during UK peacetime since the 
nineteenth century. It is confirmed to have resulted in 72 casualties and 70 physically injured. It 
has also left a community physically and emotionally scarred. That the catastrophe occurred in 
the country’s wealthiest borough added to the shock while the circumstances surrounding it also 
begged questions relating to political and corporate responsibility. The UK Prime Minister swiftly 
established a public inquiry which is ongoing and anticipated to stretch well into 2019. This paper 
offers a preliminary analysis of what some are interpreting to be a national atrocity. It begins by 
describing the events at the time of the fire while also identifying the key controversies that began 
to surface. It then examines the local geography of Grenfell Tower and the surrounding Lancaster 
West Estate revealing an astonishing landscape of inequality across the borough of Kensington 
and Chelsea. The paper then uncovers how such inequality was combined with a malevolent 
geography of injustice whereby for several years residents raised regular warnings about the 
building’s safety only to be disregarded by the very organizations which were there ostensibly to 
protect and safeguard their livelihoods: the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea municipal 
authority and the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation. The paper then 
deepens the analysis identifying how these organizations disavowed the local democratic 
process, in doing so dishonouring so tragically the Grenfell residents. It then finds this democratic 
disavowal to be multiscalar: for amid an incremental neoliberal political assault on the national 
welfare state, public housing across the country has become wretchedly devalued, stigmatized, 
and the subject of scandalous maladministration. A final section offers some early analysis of the 
early stages of the Grenfell Inquiry, while also revealing the dignified resistance of Grenfell 
community in the face of London’s increasingly plutocratic governance.  
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Inequality, Injustice, and an Impaired Democracy 
 
Gordon MacLeod 
Department of Geography 
Durham University 
 
‘The Grenfell Tower fire has become a symbol of the inequality that exists in our country. Seventy-one1 
people tragically lost their lives, as well as the many people who lost their homes, possessions, families 
and loved ones. The first duty of the State is to protect the lives of its citizens and lessons must be 
learnt to avoid this happening again’ (Press Release by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, 
11 December 2017). 
 
The Grenfell Tower Catastrophe 
 
At 0054 (British Summer Time) on Wednesday 14 June, 2017, emergency services received 
reports of fire in a flat on the fourth floor of Grenfell Tower; a 24-storey residential block within the 
Lancaster West Estate located in the royal borough of Kensington and Chelsea in West London. 
Crews from the London Fire Brigade arrived within six minutes. But by the time they extinguished 
it, the fire had already spread beyond the kitchen window of the flat to the building’s external 
cladding before rising rapidly up its exterior at a ‘terrifying rate’ (Bulman 2017a). In response over 
250 firefighters and 70 fire engines arrived from stations across London. They were soon joined 
by the London Metropolitan Police Service, more than 100 London Ambulance Service crew and 
20 ambulances, the special Hazardous Area Response Team, and the city’s Air Ambulance2. At 
any one time, over a hundred firefighters were inside the building to rescue people, equipped with 
special breathing apparatus and stretching their professional safety protocols (Doward 2017a). 
The building’s own safety regulations instructed residents to remain inside their flats in the event 
of a fire – the so-called ‘stay put’ policy – advice repeated by the emergency services. By 0400, 
though, flames and thick smoke engulfed all sides of Grenfell Tower, inhibiting visibility above the 
fourth floor. With charred debris falling from the upper floors, rescued residents and firefighters 
themselves were now being protected by plastic shields held horizontally by riot police officers 
who had been drafted in (Castle et al 2017). At 0414, and reversing the earlier instructions, a 
senior officer from the Metropolitan Police addressed a swelling crowd nearby Grenfell to 
announce: ‘Listen, if you know people inside, tell them to self-evacuate, do not wait for the fire 
brigade. If you get a phone-call or twitter, tell them, you tell them to get out now’ (Whinnett and 
Miranda 2017). Neighbours and friends reported of people being trapped inside the burning 
building switching torches, mobile phones, or electric lights on and off, some waving from 
windows while holding children, some jumping from higher floors (Weaver et al 2017). It was 
already apparent that a truly catastrophic event was unfolding before their eyes.  
 
As firefighters and emergency services continued tirelessly to extinguish the fire and save lives, 
residents from the surrounding low-rise housing blocks on the Lancaster West Estate and other 
local neighbourhoods – some having just been instructed to evacuate their own homes – began 
to congregate around the police cordon that had been established. All were observing in horror 
while simultaneously endeavouring to voice some hope and reassurance to those visible in the 
windows of the burning building. Some Grenfell residents had fled with merely their clothes or 
nightwear as others searched frantically for family and friends, many of whom had originally been 
instructed to stay in their flats but were no longer answering their phones (Hinsliff 2017; Ross 
2017). Local institutional support emerged swiftly. The Maxilla Social Club opened at 0200 and 
The Harrow Club youth centre at 0300. And by 0330, St Clement’s church, St James’s church, 
Notting Hill Methodist church, the Rugby Portobello Trust, Westway Trust, and Latymer Christian 
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Centre had all opened their doors to provide refuge, water, food, tea, coffee and care to those 
affected by the major incident (Fraser 2017; Hattenstone 2017). Before long volunteers were 
arriving from boroughs across London and further afield: they brought water, food, clothes, bed-
linen, blankets, toiletries, sanitary products, and toys in what was an extraordinary nation-wide 
groundswell of generosity and compassion (Kennedy 2018a). Notices also began to appear on 
social media sites and at the community centres offering beds: Westway Trust confirming its 
gymnasium could provide 300 emergency beds that evening (Sawer 2017).  
 
Such voluntary benevolence and community support contrasted with what seemed to many as 
the palpable lack of an official municipal presence (d’Ancona 2017; Kennedy 2018a). Ahmed 
Chellat, whose brother-in-law, wife, and three children had not been heard from since 0230, 
stated how ‘for five hours we’ve been here with my sister-in-law and some tenants. There’s no 
councillors, no TMO3 to say exactly what’s going on. If it wasn’t for the local people we would be 
in the street’4 (Ross 2017). Indeed it was widely reported that no officials – either from Grenfell 
Tower’s owner, the Conservative-run Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea council, or its 
landlord, the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation – were on hand to 
gather the names of survivors or those missing5, or to advise on whether the clumps of ash that 
continued to fall onto the streets and sidewalks might be toxic (Nadel 2017; Platt 2017). At 0930, 
the London Fire Commissioner reported of fatalities. By noon the Metropolitan Police Service 
confirmed six people dead and more than 70 in hospital. Hundreds of ‘missing’ posters and 
appeals for information on family and friends who had not been seen since the outbreak of the fire 
began to appear on the Latymer Centre and around nearby churches, alongside messages of 
love, sympathy and support (Slawson et al 2017). As volunteers became overwhelmed with 
donations, frustration intensified over a vacuum of official municipal guidance. So while lauding 
the efforts of Reverend Mike Long, who was running the Notting Hill Methodist church, local 
Labour councillor Judith Bakeman underlined how ‘there’s been so many cuts [to council budgets 
that], there aren’t enough people to deal with this’ (Weaver et al 2017). At St Clement’s church, 
council officials were helping. But their sudden announcement to survivors – that ‘[W]e are going 
to close the doors at seven o’clock. [And]…We urge you to find friends and family close by and 
stay with them’ – generated absolute astonishment among the clergy and volunteers, who roundly 
rebuked their call and continued to provide care and support (Graham-Harrison 2017, 6). 
 
Grenfell Tower and the Lancaster West Estate sit in the north of Kensington and Chelsea. Much 
of it is social housing and home to predominantly lower and modest income, working class, and 
many black and minority ethnic people, some of whom are migrants: they are in essence ‘ordinary 
Londoners’ (Alibhai-Brown 2017; Khan 2017; Madden 2017; Obordo 2017; Watt 2017). It is 
surrounded by conspicuously more affluent neighbourhoods. And questions began to surface 
about whether a building which housed wealthy people, or indeed whether one of the more 
recently constructed luxury towers enclosing the über-rich in central London (Graham 2015), 
would have caught fire so rapidly and burned for so long. Such sensibilities were further fuelled by 
local knowledge that on numerous occasions since 2013, Grenfell residents had raised serious 
concerns about fire safety with the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation 
(GAG 2013a; 2016a; 2016b; Tucker 2017a; and see below). At 1100 on 15 June, the number of 
confirmed deaths was updated to 17, around which time the local community became aware that 
the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, was just conducting a private visit to the Grenfell area. She 
had spoken with emergency service crews but did not meet survivors of the fire because of 
‘security reasons’: a decision which infuriated local residents and promptly reverberated across all 
forms of media, her taciturn detachment so obviously contrasting with the warmth, generosity, 
compassion, and courage of emergency service personnel, volunteers, and donors (Cockburn 
2017; Pasha-Robinson 2017a). Among what were now thousands of heartfelt messages of 
support, appeal, grief and solidarity imprinted on the Latymer Christian Centre tribute wall just off 
Bramley Road were some unequivocally pointed questions about injustice; one simply asserting 
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‘Justice for Grenfell. Jail those responsible’ (Said-Moorhouse 2017). It was becoming apparent 
that amid the outpouring of community distress and sorrow: 
 
‘There was a volatile sense of grievance in a neighbourhood that felt overlooked and neglected, whose 
worst fears had suddenly attracted the world’s attention, and where in the immediate aftermath of 
disaster the authorities were nowhere to be seen’ (Ross 2017, 3).  
 
Acutely conscious of the widespread condemnation surrounding her visit the previous day, and 
perhaps mindful of escalating hostility for a Conservative-led municipal authority which appeared 
to be failing its less well-off constituents in a high profile wealthy borough, Theresa May returned 
to the neighbourhood on Friday 16 June. She chose a meeting with a selected group of families 
at St Clement’s church to announce measures including £5 million to help with immediate costs 
for families affected by the fire alongside a pledge that all displaced residents would be rehoused 
locally within three weeks (Stewart and Elgot 2017). But when departing the church, Mrs May 
required police protection as numerous local people voiced their disapproval of her government’s 
sluggish reaction to what was increasingly acknowledged to be a humanitarian catastrophe 
(Addley 2017a; Farha 2017; Madden 2017). With police now reporting 30 fatalities and 58 missing 
(Bulman 2017b), protesters had gathered outside Kensington and Chelsea Town Hall presenting 
a list of democratic demands, not least to confirm the precise number of people who had been 
living in Grenfell Tower and for “the chief executive of the council to make public commitments on 
what the council is going to do for the victims of this borough, and for all the other buildings in the 
borough that [could] stand the same fate as Grenfell Tower” (Al Mansur, 16 June; in Learmonth 
2017). Many then returned to Grenfell participating in a series of spontaneous speeches as 
candles were lit and flowers laid outside the Latymer Centre (Humphry 2017). The evening also 
saw a protest outside the Department for Communities and Local Government in Whitehall, 
where an estimated 1,400 people were voicing ‘Justice for Grenfell’ (Grierson and Gayle 2017).  
 
In the days that followed, the sense of loss coupled with outrage and injustice was undiminished 
as the number of fatalities was estimated to be 80 and questions surfaced about the specific type 
of external cladding that had been installed on Grenfell Tower as part of a major renovation that 
had taken place during 2015-16 (Doward 2017b). Families of victims and survivors began posing 
questions as to whether friends and relatives had perished as a result of cost-cutting measures. 
The period since has revealed the Grenfell community and representatives to balance legitimate 
indignation with gracious dignity. And at the time of writing, the Grenfell disaster is confirmed to 
have led to 72 fatalities and 70 people injured, with 151 homes destroyed in the tower and 
surrounding area leading many of the households affected by the fire to remain in temporary 
accommodation or hotels for long after the event6 (Gentleman 2017a; Rawlinson 2017). The 
remainder of this paper aims to present a preliminary analysis of the Grenfell catastrophe. The 
next section offers detail on the geography of Grenfell Tower and the Lancaster West Estate 
revealing an astonishing landscape of inequality in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea 
vis-à-vis housing, wealth and service provision (Dent Coad 2017a; Derbyshire 2017). There then 
follows a discussion of the circumstances preceding the fire whereby for several years Grenfell 
residents were scandalously disregarded by the organizations that existed precisely to protect 
and safeguard their livelihoods and interests: the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea 
municipal authority and the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation. The 
following section deepens the analysis to examine how these organizations disavowed the local 
democratic process and in doing so dishonoured so tragically the Grenfell residents. However, 
such democratic disavowal has also ensued via the central state amid a creeping neoliberal 
political assault on the UK national state that has effectively led to its ‘dismembering’ (Toynbee 
and Walker 2017), not least in the sphere of public housing. In developing this analysis, the paper 
takes inspiration from Deborah Orr’s opinion piece, where she points towards the ‘complacent 
indifference’ of key organizations, not least those of the RBKC council and the KCTMO, and the 
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‘layers of apathy and casual disregard’ which were conducive in shaping the horror of 14 June: 
and how, given these lines of causality and again following Orr, it is valid to interpret ‘Grenfell not 
a disaster or a tragedy, but an atrocity’ (Orr 2017, 34). A final section offers some early analysis 
of the early stages of the Grenfell Inquiry, while also revealing the dignified resistance of Grenfell 
community in the face of London’s increasingly plutocratic governance.  
 
‘If you go further down this road, it feels like you have gone into a different 
world’: Parallel Livelihoods in Kensington and Chelsea 
 
‘The disparity between rich and poor in this city is disgusting. This [the Grenfell fire] would not have 
happened to the £5m flats around the corner’ (Danny Vance, associate pastor, Notting Hill Community 
Church; 15 June 2017; in Bell 2017). 
 
Grenfell Tower and the Lancaster West Estate are located close to where the north end of St 
Ann’s Road meets Bramley Road, and near the Latimer Road underground station. The Estate 
and the lower-rise buildings on nearby side streets are majority social housing with some private 
rented, and in 2015 the vicinity was among the ‘top 10 percent most deprived areas in England’ 
(Barr 2017; Snowdon et al 2017). A seven minute walk south, down St Ann’s Road from the 
Lancaster West Estate, and one arrives at St Ann’s Villas and on the left St James’s Gardens: in 
each spot a three bedroom terraced townhouse can fetch between £3 million and £6 million. A 
few minutes east of the Estate sits Elgin Crescent: an elegant arc whose larger properties sell for 
between £12 million and £30 million (Chakrabortty 2017a), feverishly inflated by virtue of lying 
within the now lavishly fashionable Notting Hill7. This is not unusual in London, where affluent 
property owners may live cheek by jowl with lower income communities residing in densely 
packed social housing (Addley 2017b). Indeed St Ann’s Road perhaps offers a microcosm of 
Kensington and Chelsea (Figure 1): a borough where the average annual salary – at £123,000 – 
is the highest in the UK, but also where over one-third of workers earn below £20,000 and 4,500 
children live in poverty (Bell 2017). Such conspicuous inequalities are further reflected in the 
services available to the different communities. For while Kensington and Chelsea is abundant 
with handsome parks and green spaces, tennis courts, and other sporting facilities, many of these 
are formerly public and community assets which are now increasingly privatized just as austerity-
induced cuts to council budgets have decimated funding for primary school sports and ended free 
swimming for children and pensioners, all trends which heighten concerns about sharpening 
health inequalities8 (Nadel 2017; Obordo 2017). In the words of one North Kensington resident:  
 
‘A lot of the clubs where children used to play, the clubs for the elderly, they have all been shut down. If 
you go to different areas in Kensington, you can see a lot of money being invested in that area, but 
whatever we have here, they cut it. And everything they build here is private. If you go further down this 
[St Ann’s] road, it feels like you have gone into a different world’ (Soran Karami; in Addley 2017b, 7).  
 
Amid this juxtaposition of radically diverse livelihoods, it is important to underline how the 
municipal provision of social housing protects many low and modest income households from the 
merciless vagaries of London’s housing market, not least its soaring private rents (Watt 2009; 
Atkinson 2017). Demand for social housing is therefore intense across the city. Yet in 2014, just 
when the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea council (RBKC) was confronting a waiting 
list of 2677 social housing applicants, the authority had no plans to build any new social housing, 
agreeing only to contribute £2.9 million to a project initiated by the Peabody Trust9 to build 112 
homes with an unspecified number of social units (Atkinson et al 2017). Indeed the overall stock 
of social housing in Kensington and Chelsea is declining – only ten new council-funded homes 
have been built since 1990 (Broughton 2018) – as significant numbers of council and housing 
association properties are deemed ‘non-viable’ and placed on the private market or transferred to 
‘affordable rent’. For instance, between 2014 and 2016 the Notting Hill and Genesis housing 
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associations10 sold 711 ‘low cost’ homes and converted 1322 from ‘social’ to ‘affordable rent’ 
(Dent Coad 2017b): given how the latter is calculated at 80 per cent of the market rate, this 
represents a cruel absurdity in a borough where the average home costs £1.5 million and whose 
ruling council executive would deem rent controls a socialist abhorrence11. Moreover, this 
disposal of municipal assets has been running in tandem with a malevolent geography of 
displacement. For the RBKC has the second highest ‘out of borough placements’12 in England; a 
policy designed to relocate homeless people to different boroughs (Booth 2015a; Foster 2017a).  
 
The case of Sutton Dwellings in Chelsea helps reveal the social and economic stakes and the 
political conflict that can surface in such transformations. Under the stewardship of philanthropist, 
William Sutton, Sutton Dwellings were built in 1913 to provide ‘houses for use and occupation by 
the poor’ (Sutton 1894; in Booth 2015b). For decades they offered low rent housing to Londoners. 
In February 2015, the housing association which owned the estate, Affinity Sutton, announced 
plans to demolish all 462 social housing flats, rebuilding 237 for social rent and 106 for private 
sale (Batty 2017). Late in 2016, following a Save the Sutton Estate13 campaign led by residents 
and involving celebrities including Eddie Izzard, Affinity Sutton found its proposals rejected even 
by the RBKC on the grounds that they failed to provide sufficient levels of replacement social 
housing (Booth 2016). While the campaign recorded a notable political achievement in averting a 
sizeable sell-off of social housing, it was unable to prevent Affinity Sutton ‘decanting’ numerous 
residents from the neighbourhood while employing workers to destroy the interior of many flats so 
as to render them ‘uninhabitable to squatters’ (Blower 2017; LBC 2017). Then, in the summer of 
2017, Affinity Sutton – which had confirmed a post-tax surplus14 of £145 million in 2015-16 before 
merging with Circle to form Clarion Housing Group (Brown 2016) – lodged an appeal with the UK 
government planning inspectorate against the RBKC decision while simultaneously outlining its 
intention to proceed with the lucrative development regardless (Batty 2017). Being submitted the 
day before the Grenfell fire, it appeared retrospectively as a profoundly insensitive plea. And it 
provoked Robert Atkinson, Labour leader within the Conservative council, to write to Communities 
and Local Government (DCLG) minister, Sajid Javid, urging the national government to:  
 
‘…take control of the [Sutton] estate from its rogue owners [and further how…] Clarion has emptied the 
Sutton Estate cynically and on purpose, so that they can cash in. … They see the estate as being their 
financial salvation. It’s disgusting. [Although] it’s not just Clarion. As housing associations have got 
bigger and have kept merging they seem to be turning themselves into property developers and quite 
openly say for every apartment we sell off in central London we can construct six in other parts of the 
country or further out of London. It’s not on’ (Robert Atkinson; in Batty 2017). 
 
Atkinson also underlined how, just as Affinity/Clarion’s debased actions left 150 flats in the Sutton 
Dwellings lying empty, the borough was confronting an acute housing shortage following the 
Grenfell fire, with 158 families forced into temporary accommodation, many in hotels (Batty 2017; 
2018). Indeed public scorn in the aftermath of Grenfell justifiably politicised the scale of empty 
properties in Kensington and Chelsea. For while England and London have each witnessed a fall 
in empty homes over a ten year period up to 2016, the royal borough recorded a rise, with 1652 
unoccupied and 603 vacant for over two years (Batty et al 2017). Many are not social housing. 
Instead they serve to reveal how mere private ownership of property in the UK’s wealthiest 
borough can reap astonishingly rich reward. Granted, any homes in England which lie empty for 
two years are levied with an additional 50 per cent council (property) tax: but the net effect is 
merely to ‘punish’ owners of Kensington and Chelsea’s townhouses with a few hundred pounds 
on properties that are worth millions or tens of millions. Further research revealed many vacant 
properties in Kensington and Chelsea to be owned by a cabal of ‘foreign royalty’ and overseas 
oligarchs including Dmytro Firtash: a Ukrainian preoccupied with fighting extradition to the US 
while the home he purchased for £53 million back in 2014 – the former Brompton Road tube 
station – remains empty (ibid). Meanwhile the anti-corruption agency, Transparency International 
(2015), identified 5,83515 properties in the borough to be owned by companies registered in 
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offshore secrecy jurisdictions. All of which fuels a disquieting sense that some of the most 
coveted real estate in west-central London is being utilised entirely ‘as a safe haven … to store 
capital, safely and secretly, where its origins will not be questioned’ (Glucksberg 2016, 244).  
 
It is also vital to appreciate how this unpardonable geography of inequality punctuating the Royal 
Borough – where elegant uninhabited mansions rub alongside communities enduring diminishing 
public services, a housing crisis, and rising homelessness – has not materialised innocently via 
some benign hand of a fêted market economy (Shaxson 2013). And to be sure the Grenfell 
disaster has done much to stir local consciousness about precisely who has been presiding over 
the borough’s incongruous social ecology (Barr 2017; Figure 1). One person who has worked 
vigorously to question the hegemonic political arrangements in the Royal Borough is Emma Dent 
Coad (Adams 2017). As a Labour councillor in the RBKC for eleven years, Dent Coad railed 
against some of London’s ‘most extreme gentrification’. Emboldened by a sense that many 
across the borough were uneasy about growing inequality, Dent Coad stood as Labour Party 
candidate in the UK general election of June 2017, and by a margin of 20 votes, became the first 
ever Labour MP in Kensington16. Five days later, and along with her north Kensington neighbours 
and constituents, Dent Coad awoke early to the most dreadful news. Since then she has vowed 
to seek justice for Grenfell victims (Booth 2017; Gentleman 2017b; Adams 2017; Addley 2017a). 
 
‘They want people like us out of the area’. Disregard, Intimidation, Social 
Cleansing: Toward a Local Political Economy of Contempt 
 
‘When people hear about the royal borough of Kensington and Chelsea, this [Grenfell Tower and the 
Lancaster West Estate] isn’t the part they think of. And that unfortunately includes the council’ (Rochelle 
Thomas, volunteer at Henry Dickens Centre, 17 June; quoted in Graham-Harrison 2017, 6).   
 
‘In an inner-London borough as rich as Kensington and Chelsea, social housing is at once integral – in 
that it forms a massive proportion of its housing stock, and houses a large number of its working 
residents and families – and yet invisible. This means tenants could warn, repeatedly and with 
escalating fear, that the building they lived in was a death trap; it meant they felt harassed and 
intimidated by the landlord and subcontractors during the recent renovation; and it meant, ultimately, 
that they would be the victims of possibly criminal levels of neglect’ (Hanley 2017). 
 
Located in the Notting Dale ward of North Kensington, the Lancaster West Estate was conceived 
in the late 1960s as part of a wider redevelopment to replace several rows of Victorian terraces 
which local authorities had designated to have become ‘slum housing’ (RBKC 2012). The 1968 
Masterplan, designed by architects Clifford Wearden and Associates, promised ‘a balance of all 
the essential facilities required to create a comprehensive community’ (Boughton 2017; Gras 
2017). The Estate was completed in 1974, with Grenfell Tower its apex and three ‘finger blocks’ 
of lower rise buildings radiating south. It nonetheless failed to incorporate certain ‘essential 
facilities’ recommended in the original Masterplan, such as local shops and a swimming pool. And 
during the 1980s and 1990s, the Lancaster West Estate endured funding scarcities, deteriorating 
infrastructure, declining amenities, and deficient maintenance (Platt 2017): all characteristic of a 
depressingly familiar story vis-à-vis prolonged governmental malevolence towards public housing 
(Hanley 2007; McKenzie 2015; Dorling 2015; Broughton 2018). Responding to resident concerns 
about its steady decline, in 1996 RBKC introduced a new body, the Kensington and Chelsea 
Tenant Management Organization (KCTMO), to assume responsibility for maintenance of the 
Lancaster West Estate while ownership remained with the Council (ASH 2017). This arrangement 
has overseen several ‘improvements’ to the Estate, notably the construction of the Kensington 
Aldridge Academy at the north-facing foot of Grenfell Tower, a rebuilding of the Kensington 
Leisure Centre (KALC), and the approval in 2012 of plans for a £10 million renovation of Grenfell 
Tower (Apps 2017). Designed by Studio E Architects (RBKC 2012) and undertaken during 2015-
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16 by Rydon Construction, the internal refurbishment provided nine additional flats alongside 
improvements to energy efficiency and community facilities while significant external fittings 
included replacement windows, new over-cladding, and curtain wall façades offering the tower ‘a 
fresher, modern look’ (Rydon 2016).  
 
Nonetheless, a growing sense of estrangement from the KCTMO’s decision-making over these 
developments had led some Grenfell Tower residents to establish the Grenfell Action Group 
(GAG) in 2010, not least in opposition to the Aldridge Academy and KALC on the grounds that 
they would usurp any remaining publicly accessible green space in the vicinity (ASH 2017). The 
Group had also campaigned vigorously about safety concerns in the Tower itself (Noor, 2017; 
Platt 2017; Tucker 2017a). In January 2013, the GAG posted a blog outlining how the KALC 
development had eliminated the Lancaster Road car park thereby obstructing the emergency 
access zone while warning how this “could have lethal consequences in the event of a serious fire 
or similar emergency in Grenfell Tower” (GAG 2013a). The following month, it revealed how a risk 
assessment undertaken by one of the KCTMO’s own safety officers had identified fire firefighting 
equipment to have remained unchecked for four years (GAG 2013b). The Group contacted both 
the KCTMO management and the RBKC Cabinet Member for Housing and Property to raise 
these concerns, but received no replies. Later that year, in May, residents began experiencing 
distressing electrical power surges, with smoke emerging from appliances, some even exploding 
or catching fire. Regular reports were submitted from residents to the KCTMO over an eighteen 
day period but were ignored before finally being acknowledged on 29th May by which time surges 
had ‘escalated out of control’ (GAG 2013c). All of which proceeded to erode trust between the 
KCTMO and Grenfell residents (Apps 2017). And of course the significance of these electrical 
surges ought not to be under-estimated given that the catastrophic blaze of June 14 was traced to 
a faulty refrigerator generating the original fire in the fourth floor flat (Dearden 2017).  
 
Following the 2015-16 renovation, residents began voicing anxieties to the KCTMO about the fact 
there was only one fire escape route (itself oftentimes blocked by refuse), as well as numerous 
exposed gas pipes, no obvious evacuation procedure, and the absence of a building-wide fire-
alarm and a sprinkler system (Booth et al 2017; Tucker 2017a). Moreover, in a speech to the 
RBKC Housing and Planning Scrutiny Committee in January 2016, David Collins, the then Chair 
of the Grenfell Tower residents’ association, presented evidence that 90 per cent of residents 
were dissatisfied with the ‘improvement works’ while 68 per cent had experienced intimidation 
from the TMO, prompting him to recommend an inquiry into the KCTMO. His call was summarily 
dismissed by the committee (Foster 2017b). Perhaps, though, it is a blog posted in November 
2016 that reveals the most tragically prescient warning:  
 
‘It is a truly terrifying thought but the Grenfell Action Group firmly believe that only a catastrophic event 
will expose the ineptitude and incompetence of our landlord, the KCTMO, and bring an end to the 
dangerous living conditions and neglect of health and safety legislation that they inflict upon their 
tenants and leaseholders. We believe that the KCTMO are an evil, unprincipled, mini-mafia who have 
no business to be charged with the responsibility of looking after the everyday management of large 
scale social housing estates and that their sordid collusion with the RBKC Council is a recipe for a 
future major disaster. … It is our conviction that a serious fire in a tower block or similar high density 
residential property is the most likely reason that those who wield power at the KCTMO will be found 
out and brought to justice!’ (GAG 20th November 2016). 
 
This grievous disregard for the safety of Grenfell residents exhibited by the KCTMO and the 
RBKC has a wider political and economic context demanding brief analysis. Firstly, papers 
released by the RBKC Housing and Property Scrutiny Committee from 2013 reveal how the 
contractor originally scheduled to undertake the Grenfell Tower renovation, Leadbitter, was 
rejected because its quotation of £11.28 million exceeded the proposed £10 million budget of the 
KCTMO-RBKC. It was only after the contract went out to further competitive tender that Rydon 
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gained approval for the project with a quote of £8.7 million (Hills 2017). It surely begs questions 
about how a building revamp originally quoted at £11.3 million could conceivably be delivered for 
£2.6 million less without some drop in quality and standards. Second, documents obtained by The 
Guardian disclose how Leadbitter’s plans included recommendations from Studio A architects 
and engineers to deploy a zinc composite external cladding with a fire-retardant core; notably a 
decision approved by residents (RBKC 2012). However, as part of a ‘value engineering process’ 
initiated by the RBKC, £293,369 was saved from the cladding expenses by opting for cheaper 
aluminium panels17: crucially they contained a core that has since proved more combustible in 
tests and been a foremost source of concern among firefighters, safety experts and architects 
while also being banned on buildings higher than twelve metres in Germany and the USA18 
(Booth and Evans 2017; Walker 2017a; Booth 2018b). Third, shortly after the fire the leader of the 
RBKC, Nicholas Paget-Brown, informed BBC Newsnight of how the council had received 
assurances that any fire in a high-rise ought to be contained within the flat of origin – a process 
known as ‘compartmentalization’ (Dearden 2018) – and that there was no ‘collective view’ among 
residents to retrofit sprinklers given the scope for further disruption and delay to the renovation. 
However, Paget Brown’s claims are disputed in reports which indicate that residents actively 
requested sprinklers alongside additional fire escapes (Cockburn 2017; Kentish 2017a).  
 
These Guardian documents further reveal the overall cost of the ‘external façade’ – comprising 
the aluminium cladding, windows, and curtain walling – to have been £3,476,855. Again it is worth 
placing this in context. For in 2016 the RBKC accumulated £4.5 million from the sale of just two 
three-bedroomed council houses in Chelsea – so £1 million more than it was prepared to spend 
on protecting 120 council homes – one of which incidentally was bought by a multimillionaire 
property investor (Booth and Evans 2017; Atkinson 2017). More than this, though, in 2014 – just 
as the RBKC-KCTMO governing bloc was enforcing its ‘value engineering’ on the renovation of 
Grenfell – the RBKC council recorded usable reserves of £274 million, rising to £300 million in 
2015-16. Indeed its finances were so buoyant it could award a £100 rebate on those wealthier 
residents in the highest council tax bracket while also providing £1.5m towards establishing a 
charity to run opera events in the affluent district of Holland Park (Walker 2017b). The bellicose 
geography of inequality uncovered in the previous section appears to be further “entrenched by 
council decisions” (Foster 2017c): decisions exposing an unashamed advancement of bourgeois 
privilege while simultaneously disavowing even the basic principles of local democracy. And for 
whom was the renovation of Grenfell Tower primarily intended? The planning approval document 
signals that the reason for the ‘materials to be used on the external faces of the building(s)… [are 
about]…ensuring that the character and appearance of the area are preserved and living 
conditions of those living near the development suitably protected’ (RBKC 2014, 2; emphasis 
added; Bowie 2017; ASH 2017). Or in the words of one world-weary local resident: 
 
‘I used to work for the council. Where there’s a tower block they want to shut it down and remove them. 
And you know why? Because the rich people want to come in. So they put the cladding up to make it 
look nice and pretty for those who are coming in, to make the property values go up’ (June 2017; cited 
in Humphry 2017). 
 
In view of such a lamentably divisive local political economy, it is little wonder how so many 
residents from the Lancaster West and Grenfell community were moved to voice comments such 
as ‘we feel like we don’t matter as people’ (in Graham-Harrison 2017, 6), and how ‘it was not just 
that they ignored us, but that they viewed us with contempt’ (Yvette Williams, organizer of the 
Justice 4 Grenfell campaign group; in Gapper 2017; see also Humphry 2017; Moore 2017a; Orr 
2017; cf. O’Hagan 2018). David Collins further lamented how some people would have been 
“trapped in their rooms, and … will have died thinking: ‘They didn’t care. They didn’t listen’” (cited 
in Foster 2017b). And a local pastor publicly voiced how: 
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‘The people on the lowest incomes of this parish simply do not feel listened to, either this week or in 
previous years, by those in power. Worse than that, what the whole issue of the cladding and the lack 
of sprinklers may well highlight is that some people in our society have simply become excess and 
debris on our neoliberal, unregulated, individualistic, capitalist and consumerist society’ (Father Robert 
Thompson, curate of St Clement’s and a local Labour councillor, delivering his sermon on 18th June, 
2017; cited in Fraser 2017). 
 
Finally, the catastrophe of Grenfell has intensified debate about the lived experience of social 
cleansing and state-induced gentrification across London (Elmer and Denning 2016; Paton and 
Cooper 2016; Watt and Minton 2016; Foster 2017d; Tucker 2017a; Vulliamy 2017). A library 
assistant from one of the low-rise blocks near Grenfell put it forthrightly: ‘They want people like us 
out of the area’ (in Gentleman 2017c, 9). Beinazir Lasharie, a Labour Councillor and resident of 
the Testerton Walk finger block in the Lancaster West Estate who was evacuated at the time of 
the fire, offered a more detailed perspective: ‘We are a nuisance to the council. Their attitude is: 
how dare so many ethnic minority foreigners who are not well-off live in these ugly flats… They 
don’t care about us, they don’t listen to us. It’s as if they want us to move out. They are socially 
cleansing us across the borough’ (in ibid). Trust in the institutions of the state, already low amid a 
persistent failure to listen to the concerns of residents, were to plummet in the aftermath of the fire 
(Chakrabortty 2017b): the RBKC council and the KCTMO in particular now forced to encounter a 
truly devastated community they each had tragically dishonored, and in the philosophical 
language of Jacques Ranciere (1999), profoundly wronged.  
 
Grenfell Tower as a National Atrocity: Disavowing Democracy, 
Dismembering the State, Dishonoring Public Housing 
 
‘Residents at Grenfell Tower describe how, as the local council outsourced contracts to private 
companies to work on their estate, essential elements of local democracy became unavailable to them. 
Their voices weren’t heard, information they requested wasn’t granted, outcomes they were promised 
did not transpire, complaints they made were not answered. The outcome at Grenfell was unique in its 
scale but the background is a common enough story. Wherever regeneration of social housing has 
been outsourced to private developers, responsiveness, transparency, oversight and scrutiny – key 
elements of healthy democracy – are lessened for those most directly affected’ (Tucker 2017b). 
 
‘The Grenfell Tower fire was a national atrocity’ (Michael Mansfield QC, lawyer for Grenfell relatives, 
speaking at the Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry in Holborn Bars, central London, on 11 December; cited 
in Bowcott and Gentleman 2017a).   
 
Disavowing Local Democracy 
 
In the days immediately after the fire, residents of the Lancaster West Estate and the friends and 
relatives of those missing became increasingly exasperated at the ineptitude of the RBKC council 
in confronting the disaster. Particular grievances related to a lack of visible street level staff to 
offer advice; a failure to communicate information to families about fatalities and of those still 
missing; delays in finding temporary accommodation; and the chaotic orchestration of the 
voluntary effort, including an alarming incapacity to distribute money being donated (cf. Blagrove 
2017; Livingston 2017; O’Hagan 2018). Residents of the finger block flats were further distressed 
by conflicting advice from police and local state officials on whether they could return to their 
homes. For instance, Nina Masroh, who works at the Kensington Aldridge Academy, informed 
journalists that while their family home was closer to the tower than the school and the Latimer 
Road tube station, both of which had been closed due to the risk of falling debris, complained how 
‘we’ve had no one here to tell us if it is safe [to return]…We feel so angry’ (Gentleman 2017d, 4). 
Amid calls from an aggrieved and traumatized community for the RBKC leadership to resign over 
its calamitous response to the disaster (Grierson and Gayle 2017; Nadel 2017), on Sunday June 
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18, the Conservative central government transferred key responsibilities of the relief effort to a 
Grenfell Fire Response Team. This was to be led by the City of London Corporation chief 
executive, John Barradell, with support from the DCLG as well as other London local authorities, 
the Metropolitan Police, the British Red Cross, and the London Fire Brigade, all designed to 
provide 24-hour support for housing, health, food, and social care (Pasha-Robinson 2017b). 
 
This decision cast shame on such a wealthy borough council, and it was no surprise when chief 
executive, Nicholas Holgate, resigned on 21 June. Eight days later, the RBKC did little to help 
recover its legitimacy. It was the first full meeting addressing the Grenfell disaster and – voicing 
concerns about possible ‘disruption’ – Council leader Paget-Brown issued instructions that it be 
held in private without the presence of the media or local residents. A legal challenge was lodged 
by The Guardian leading to confusion and an eventual adjournment, again following orders from 
Paget-Brown (Foster 2017e; Walker and Weaver 2017). It is convention for council meetings to 
be open to the public. So the RBKC’s decision only served to further intensify distrust within a 
community desperate for information. It also signified a belligerent contempt for the democratic 
process. And amid criticism from the Prime Minister, the following day saw Paget-Brown and his 
deputy Feilding-Mellen resign, although calls from some local community voices for the whole 
cabinet to resign were resisted (Nadel 2017). Instead two Conservative councillors, Elizabeth 
Campbell and Kim Taylor-Smith, were duly nominated as leader and deputy leader respectively 
(Simpson 2017). Campbell’s first statement was fulsomely apologetic: ‘The first thing I want to do 
is … apologise. This is our community and we have failed it when people needed us the most’ 
(Pasha-Robinson 2017c). Such failings were underlined in the Independent Grenfell Recovery 
Taskforce report identifying the RBKC to be a ‘distant council that did not know its residents’, with 
many citizens in the north of the borough feeling they ‘suffered from “political neglect” and that 
their local area was a “political blind spot” for RBKC’ (IGRT 2017, 4, 10).  
 
Of course it is important to reiterate that responsibility for the everyday governance of Grenfell 
Tower and the Lancaster West Estate lay not with the RBKC but the KCTMO. The latter’s own 
mission statement proudly proclaims the delivery of ‘excellent housing services through resident 
led management’19. However, as revealed earlier, it had demonstrated utter disregard for the 
Grenfell residents who had persistently articulated their anxiety about fire safety (Morrison 2017). 
And on the two month anniversary of the Grenfell fire, such concerns were reflected in an open 
letter to the RBKC signed by the heads of 25 local resident associations: 
 
‘We agreed that the position of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management 
Organisation Ltd (KCTMO) is no longer tenable and that there is an urgent need to adopt a different, 
resident-focused model of managing Council housing in our borough. … We agree that there has been 
a fundamental breach of the duty of care by the KCTMO that cannot be remedied. The police have 
reasonable grounds to suspect that KCTMO committed an offence. This should be sufficient for RBK&C 
to take immediate action to end its contract with KCTMO. It is clear to us that KCTMO is not fit for 
purpose. We have no confidence in their ability to manage Council housing on behalf of RBK&C or in 
their ability to make the correct decisions about our safety’ (in Snowdon 2017). 
 
Eight days later, in a private meeting with some survivors and relatives of the Grenfell fire victims, 
the Prime Minister offered assurances that the KCTMO would be relinquishing responsibility for 
the Lancaster West Estate (Mason and Sherwood 2017). And on 27 September, the RBKC voted 
unanimously to terminate its contract, new deputy leader Taylor-Smith indicating how ‘The TMO 
no longer has the trust of residents. [And that] ...We are listening to residents and consulting on 
how they want their homes and neighbourhoods to be managed in the future’ (Sherwood 2017b). 
Listening is presumably one of numerous lessons being learnt by this thoroughly discredited local 
state. Indeed when questioned on the BBC Today programme on 20 July, Taylor-Smith conceded 
that while serving on the RBKC Housing Scrutiny Committee, he never became aware of the 
concerns about safety raised by Grenfell residents or of the long-running blogging campaign 
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waged by the Grenfell Action Group, before conceding quite astonishingly that ‘Personally I didn’t 
get involved in the scrutiny, there’s obviously something that has to be looked at’ (York 2017). 
Perhaps in identifying this ‘something to be looked at’, it is worth analyzing more forensically the 
role and the formal representation of the KCTMO alongside its relationship with the RBKC. At the 
time of the Grenfell fire, the KCTMO was managing 10,000 houses on behalf of the RBKC – its 
entire council housing stock20 – while also assuming the position of an arms-length management 
organization: a not-for-profit company providing housing services on behalf of a local authority, 
and an alternative arrangement to fully independent housing associations21. The KCTMO Board 
comprised fifteen members; four council-appointed, three independent, and eight residents. Even 
allowing for the large scale of its housing management, questions must be posed about how such 
a purportedly ‘resident-led’ approach was to disavow Grenfell residents so catastrophically.  
 
Some clues are provided in a report by Inside Housing (Apps, 2017). It reveals how just prior to 
completion of the Grenfell refurbishment, Councilor Judith Blakeman had presented a petition to 
the RBKC (and signed by 51 residents) complaining of ‘intolerable’ living conditions and a lack of 
consultation. The matter was delegated to the RBKC Housing Scrutiny Committee. And at the 
Committee’s next meeting, Edward Daffarn, the Grenfell resident and Grenfell Action Group 
mobilizer, called for an independent investigation into the management of the 2015-16 Grenfell 
refurbishment work. While the RBKC acceded to this demand, Council papers reveal a one-day 
investigation conducted by six members of the KCTMO board and a written report “commending 
the contractor Rydon on [its] performance and ability to deliver a complex construction project ... 
[and also] the TMO team involved in high quality management of the project over 22 months” 
(Apps 2017). ‘Baffled’ by this cloistered self-scrutiny, Blakeman – a non-executive member of the 
KCTMO – disputed these claims, indicating how she had raised nineteen complaints on behalf of 
individual Grenfell residents about fire safety while also lodging her frustration about the limited 
horizons for resident voices to be heard. Remarkably, the Chief Executive of KCTMO, Robert 
Black, then proceeded to criticize Blakeman for speaking out in such terms, recommending that ‘a 
member of the [KCTMO] board had a duty to the board and to support the views and conclusions 
they had put forward in relation to Grenfell Tower’ (ibid). In Blakeman’s own words ‘I was treated 
like I was a nuisance’ (in Booth and Wahlquist 2017). Daffarn too revealed how, since the period 
just prior to commencement of the refurbishment, in his position as Housing Scrutiny Committee 
chair, Rock Feilding-Mellen, had encouraged a gradual erosion of a Tenant Consultative 
Committee22. Subsequent disclosures also uncover how some of the Grenfell residents who 
dared to voice grievances (two of whom tragically were casualties in the fire) had been threatened 
with legal action for defamation by both the KCTMO and the RBKC (Osborne 2017).  
 
All of which is indicative of a grievous vacuum of accountability alongside a scandalously anti-
democratic approach to governing public housing (Foster 2017b; Bowie 2017; Tucker 2017a; 
Broughton 2018). Siân Berry, the Green Party chair of the London Assembly Housing Committee, 
encapsulates much of the problem: 
 
‘…when [residents] raise fire safety, when they raise life-threatening issues, they need to be listened to, 
and there just currently isn’t the structure for that to happen… There are many, many groups, like the 
Grenfell Action Group, who are getting involved in trying to make their homes better and they are 
treated with suspicion by the authorities – they are regarded as troublemakers as this group was – and I 
think we need to change that at a much bigger level’ (in Weaver et al. 2017). 
 
In the case of Grenfell, however, the disavowal of democracy extends to the KCTMO’s contract 
with Rydon and the latter’s own deployment of at least eight sub-contractor firms in the Grenfell 
refurbishment23. The fragmentary effect of this subcontracting has led architectural experts to 
question the levels of expertise and the degree of oversight in the Grenfell renovation, particularly 
in view of how the increasing privatization of the building inspection regime encourages a cost-
cutting ‘race to the bottom’: one enabling private companies to reap immense profits in providing 
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publicly necessary goods and services while also evading the scrutiny of local democratic control 
(Chakrabortty 2017a; Foster 2017f; Tucker 2017a). For political theorist, Wendy Brown, trends 
like these expose any aspiration to deliver reliable public goods to the vicissitudes of financial 
markets and the murky world of speculative derivatives, thereby furthering a ‘marketization and 
outsourcing of the state’ while simultaneously undoing the demos (Brown 2015, 71). 
 
Outsourcing, Anti-Regulation, Austerity: Dismembering the State 
 
‘For years successive governments have built what they call a bonfire of regulations. … But what they 
call red tape often consists of essential public protections that defend our lives’ (Monbiot 2017).  
 
This local anti-democracy is also, nonetheless, traceable to the actions of central government. 
Not least in that the original impulse to outsource erstwhile publicly managed services – at local 
and national levels – came from successive Thatcher-led governments in the 1980s: part of a 
wider endeavor to ‘roll back’ an ostensibly unwieldy and overly-bureaucratic state (Cochrane 
1993; Peck 2010), and all guided by a neoliberal doctrine promising that private providers would 
enhance efficiency while improving choice for ‘consumers’ of public goods. It has tended to leave 
citizens paying more for degraded services (Chakrabortty 2017a). But such centrally-imposed 
outsourcing and privatization has also seen an erosion of in-house expertise in local government 
and remaining officers frustrated in their capacity to scrutinize outsourced projects, leading, in 
turn, to a collapse of governmental accountability (Hetherington 2017; Raco 2013)24. Over three 
decades on and the scale of such contracts is truly breathtaking. Between 2011 and 2016, £120 
billion of government work – at least 30 per cent of which is conducted via local government – 
was awarded to private corporations whose primary duty to maximize returns for shareholders 
ultimately overrides any commitment towards a public realm (Tucker 2017b), to the extent that: 
 
‘The deployment of contractual processes as a mechanism for capturing and re-defining what is meant 
by a ‘public interest’ represents a significant challenge to our fundamental understandings of the 
modern democratic state, where power lies, and with whom’ (Raco 2013, 49). 
 
Alongside this, and as part of the deeper embedding of a neoliberal canon within the UK central 
state, successive governments – including those of New Labour (Hall 2011; Travis 2017) – have 
endeavored to strip away layers of ‘red tape’ purported to hinder the free operation of business, 
not least in construction. Peter Hetherington (2017) cites the ‘relaxation’ of building regulations in 
1986, which subsequently permitted high-rise blocks to be refurbished with exteriors less resistant 
to fire: a decision which was to impact fatally on Grenfell Tower thirty-one years later (Knapton 
and Dixon 2017). In the intervening years, government ministers channeled considerable ire in 
the direction of bureaucracy and enterprise-inhibiting ‘statism’ (Du Gay 2000; Freedland 2017): a 
convention that assumed new heights in 2014 when Housing Minister, Brandon Lewis, heralded a 
new governmental rule which insisted upon two existing regulations being removed for every new 
one introduced (Monbiot 2017). He did so in response to opposition party calls to certify that all 
construction companies fit sprinklers in new homes, before deploying the archetypal neoliberal 
rationale that “it is the responsibility of the fire industry to market sprinkler systems effectively [and 
that] the cost of fitting sprinklers may affect housebuilding, something we want to encourage” 
(Moore 2017). The Grenfell atrocity was to reveal the absurdity of Lewis’s hubristic reasoning. It 
also transpires he is one of four successive Conservative Housing Ministers who failed to act on 
the intelligence of a 2013 report into a fire in Lakanal House, Southwark, back in 2009 where six 
people died (Foster 2017d; Walker 2013). Had the recommendations to introduce fire safety 
regulations been implemented – and, moreover, had DCLG Secretary, Eric Pickles, not repealed 
Section 20 of the London Building Act one year earlier – then Grenfell Tower would have been 
more rigorously assessed (Watts 2017). This wilful neglect by Conservative Ministers has also left 
thousands of people in the UK continuing to reside in towers clad with combustible materials25. 
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That those responsible have not been called to account therefore casts shame on the democratic 
process in Westminster as well as Kensington and Chelsea (Lammy, 2017).  
 
It is also impossible to view Grenfell in isolation from austerity. For as part of its political response 
to the financial crisis of 2008-09 (Blyth 2013), the 2010 Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
government savaged the DCLG Communities Budget, with 50 per cent cuts to social housing and 
40 per cent cuts to local government impacting disproportionately on vulnerable communities 
(O’Hara 2015; Toynbee 2017). If economist Paul Krugman (2012) was justified in interpreting the 
UK government’s original political austerity drive as ‘an excuse to dismantle social programs’, 
then the zealously unrelenting deployment of austerity as ideology has left local authorities 
believing it their job to spend as little as possible (Hanley 2017; Foster 2017g). In which context it 
is worth considering the firefighters at Grenfell risking their lives in a borough where fire cover had 
been cut by 50 per cent (Gentleman et al 2017); nurses treating the injured on lower real rates of 
pay than in 2009; mental health experts facing an outbreak of post-trauma among residents and 
emergency services staff and numerous suicide attempts following the fire amid reductions in 
mental health services (Crew 2017; Pasha-Robinson 2017d); and further how the post-2010 
political strategy to confront a financial crisis effectively positioned the low and modest income 
residents of neighborhoods like the Lancaster West Estate to pay for the reckless venality of rich 
bankers, many of whom reside in luxurious mansions only streets away (Chakrabortty 2017a).  
 
In the immediate aftermath, Polly Toynbee (2017) interpreted the burnt shell of Grenfell Tower to 
be symbolic of ‘austerity in ruins’. It is also of course a catastrophic outcome of what she and 
David Walker term the ‘dismembered state’: one increasingly stripped of social and physical 
protections for citizens, and which – in the wake of outsourcing, deregulation, privatization, and a 
fostering of miscellaneous public-private and arms-length agencies – has been so ‘confusingly 
branded’ as to instill bewilderment over who or which organization might actually be responsible 
for what and where (Toynbee and Walker, 2017; Hinsliff, 2017). And as cogently argued in a 
passionate editorial the weekend after the Grenfell fire: 
 
‘…this is more than a story of a benign state being hacked at by funding cuts and deregulation. [For] 
Grenfell has peeled away the layers, to reveal an unaccountable, distant state, sheltering behind arms-
length bodies to which it has subcontracted its most fundamental responsibilities for keeping people 
safe… In this fragmented state, where the buck gets passed on by those who are democratically 
elected, what recourse do local people have when they are failed so dismally by their local services?’ 
(Observer, 18 June 2017, 34). 
 
German political theorist Claus Offe offers an analogous critique of how societies are increasingly 
exhibiting a ‘democratic inequality’; many citizens living through and experiencing a somewhat 
disempowered state, or more precisely ‘one that is overpowered by the poderes facticos [the 
powers that be] of corporate market forces’ (Offe 2013, 181).  
 
De-Municipalized, Dishonoured, Devalued: Public Housing in England 
 
‘We’re seeing the biggest challenge to this 40-year drive to marginalize or discredit the state and its role 
in the economy and society. Grenfell Tower had such impact because it symbolizes for many in Britain 
the retreat of the state, visible in badly maintained social housing and the failure to build more social 
housing’ (Simon Tilford, deputy director Centre for European Reform; in Erlanger 2017, 9) 
 
‘…the [Grenfell] fire was fed by the broken housing system; the privatisation of local government 
services; the drive for deregulation no matter the human cost; the racism that perpetuates inferior 
infrastructure and safety standards for people of colour; and the erasure of the voices and interests of 
working class and poor people from the concerns of the state’ (Madden 2017, 2). 
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The tragic lack of recourse that faced Grenfell residents is undoubtedly related to the way in 
which social housing has been a primary target of state dismemberment. What was once termed 
council housing reached a peak of 32 per cent in 1978 (Ginsburg 2005). However, as part of its 
endeavour to foster a ‘property-owning democracy’, the 1979 Thatcher government introduced 
legislation obliging municipal authorities to sell council houses to sitting tenants at significant 
discounts while denying them permission to reinvest in new housing or improving existing stock, 
just as their funding from central government was being eroded26 (Meek 2015). Council housing 
was further de-municipalized from the late 1980s via the transfer of ownership and oversight to 
housing associations27 or arms-length tenant management organizations such as the KCTMO 
(Watt 2009; Bowie 2017; Tucker 2017a). The cumulative impact of which is that many former 
council properties have been sold on to private landlords often charging double or triple the social 
rent to households unable to gain a council house due to the acute shortage28 (Meek 2015). This 
situation is especially pervasive in London. Here, many councils have been facilitating housing 
projects by selling premium sites to private developers on condition that ‘planning gain’29 enables 
inclusion of a certain proportion of ‘affordable’ units (Graham 2015). Consequently many councils 
– including Labour-controlled Camden, Hackney, Haringey, Lambeth, Newham, and Southwark – 
have overseen a forcible eviction of thousands of people across London, many making way for 
luxury redevelopments way beyond the means of local communities (Lees 2014; Elmer and 
Dening 2016; Flynn 2016). Such trends are prompting concern that as municipal government 
becomes distanced from direct housing provision and private developers assume greater sway, 
lines of accountability are blurred and housing becomes ever more defined in terms of market 
exchange rather than human use value, rendering social housing tenants to be deemed ‘a 
“necessary evil”, tolerated by the private sector only because they allow lucrative private market 
housing to be built’ (Tucker 2017a; Watt and Minton 2016; Foster 2017a). 
 
Nonetheless, analysis of these trends demands a historical geographical appreciation of the 
internal politics of the state (Duncan and Goodwin 1988; Jessop 2016). For since the era of 
Thatcherism – characterized by a central government as determined to ‘bury’ municipal socialism 
and radical left local initiatives as it was to privatize housing and public services (Gyford 1985) – 
England has generally experienced a centralizing mode of authority. Allied to serial budget cuts, 
this has curtailed the scope for local governments to nurture relatively autonomous paths for 
development, housing and service provision: New Labour’s constitutional and devolution reforms 
belying its controlling approach towards local government and local democracy (Davies 2008). 
The upshot of which is that any locally choreographed gentrification of formerly social housing in 
Southwark, Southampton, Newham or Newcastle bears a discernible imprint of the central state. 
This imprint is even more pronounced since 2010 as Conservative-led governments have been 
channelling ever more public subsidy towards ‘right to buy’ while simultaneously framing social 
housing as ‘lavish public expenditure’ (Atkinson 2017; Edwards 2016; Paton and Cooper 2016). 
Such political economic sensibilities are writ large in the 2016 Housing and Planning Act: for it 
effectively compels local authorities to sell-off high-value land and property without the messy 
trouble of engaging consultation with residents. As a cynical post-political endeavour to ‘destroy 
any form of democratic control of planning and land use’ (Minton 2017, 47), the Act is also viewed 
to signal ‘the end of council housing’ in the UK (Harris 2016). Indeed it prompted the former head 
of the UK Civil Service, Sir Bob Kerslake (2016), to conclude that ‘I have reluctantly come to the 
conclusion that for the leading figures in this government, publicly provided, social rented housing 
is now seen as toxic. This is something I deeply regret’.  
 
Nonetheless, and even for a government as merciless as the current one, it is surely a source of 
painful discomfort that the Grenfell atrocity occurred amid what has been a generation-spanning 
stigmatizing offensive waged by hegemonic bourgeois forces against the people, the places, and 
indeed the very values of municipally provided housing (Forbes 2017; Hanley 2007; McKenzie 
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2015; Slater 2016; Tucker 2017c; Watt 2017; Broughton 2018). It is in this regard that, as outlined 
by London’s Radical Housing Network on the day of the Grenfell atrocity: 
 
‘The fire at Grenfell is a horrific, preventable tragedy for which authorities and politicians must be held 
to account. Grenfell’s council tenants are not second-class citizens – yet they are facing a disaster 
unimaginable in Kensington’s richer neighbourhoods. This government, and many before it, have 
neglected council housing and disregarded its tenants as if they were second class. Nationally and 
locally, politicians have subjected public housing to decades of systematic disinvestment – leaving 
properties in a state of disrepair, and open to privatisation. Regeneration, when it has come, has been 
for the benefit of developers and buy-to-let landlords, who profit from the new luxury flats built in place 
of affordable homes. Across London, regeneration has meant evictions, poor quality building work, and 
has given tenants little meaningful influence over the future of their estates. The chronic under-
investment in council housing and contempt for tenants must stop. It is an outrage that in 21st-century 
Britain, authorities cannot be trusted to provide safe housing, and that people in council properties 
cannot put children safely to bed at night’ (Radical Housing Network, June 14 2017). 
 
Justice for Grenfell: Renouncing Plutocratic Urban Governance 
 
‘Today, we ask why warnings were not heeded; why a community was left feeling neglected, uncared 
for, not listened to. Today we hold out hope that the public inquiry will get to the truth of all that led up to 
the fire at Grenfell Tower … and we trust that the truth will bring justice’ (Graham Tomlin, Bishop of 
Kensington, Memorial Service for Grenfell six months on, St Paul’s Cathedral, 14 December 2017). 
 
‘Financial interests have increasingly set the agenda of public bodies in the UK. The worst fire in the UK 
in recent history is a lethal catastrophe […] and it has taken place in one of the wealthiest boroughs in 
one of the wealthiest cities in the world. The borough is home to many globalised commercial interests, 
with huge influence and enormous wealth. Around the world lethal and reprehensible conditions are 
permitted by wealthy elites operating from protected positions of financial privilege or bureaucracy’ 
(Ishmahil Blagrove, former coordinator for Justice4Grenfell 2017). 
 
‘The rich [...] are able to control much of economic life and the media and dominate politics, so their 
special interests and view of the world comes to restrict what democracies can do’ (Sayer 2015, 2). 
 
The dominant narrative of London is that of a world class city: one that for several years has 
topped PricewaterhouseCoopers’ global rankings for business opportunities, education, and 
quality of life30 (PwC 2016). Less prominently featured in the consultancy firm’s reports is the fact 
that no city in the global north internalizes such a gulf between rich and poor: conditions which 
render housing to be extraordinarily expensive in relative terms for virtually everyone (Dorling 
2015). In Big Capital: Who is London For?, published just prior to the Grenfell atrocity, Anna 
Minton offers prescient analysis of London’s unequal social ecology: in particular how escalating 
financialization is facilitating a mushrooming of glitzy often vertical corporate-residential citadels 
across London’s inner core alongside the afore-mentioned municipally-guided gentrification of 
social housing throughout the inner suburbs (Beswick and Penny 2018): processes which leave 
many Londoners struggling to gain or retain a home. One example that encapsulates Minton’s 
concerns is the Vauxhall Nine Elms Development on London’s South Bank. Incorporating the 
iconic Battersea Power Station and a new US Embassy, it features numerous seemingly open 
public squares which are de facto privately owned: such a routine trend nowadays that ‘every new 
“piece of the city” is privately owned and removed from a democratically accountable, genuinely 
public realm’ (Minton 2017, 23; also Sassen 2015). At least approval for the development was on 
condition that in accordance with Section 106 (see note 28), a proportion of housing units would 
be rendered ‘affordable’. Yet the Malaysian-backed Battersea Power Station Development 
Company has since reneged on this commitment, following an agreement with the Wandsworth 
council planning committee permitting the number of affordable flats to be reduced from 636 to 
386. Mayor Sadiq Khan was reported to have been ‘furious’ at the decision. For Minton these 
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events and the way in which housing has moved ‘from democratically accountable control into the 
hands of opaque companies has a big part to play in the Grenfell atrocity’ (in Bignell 2017).  
 
The power ostensibly exercised by the Malaysian-backed company in influencing the planning 
committee of Wandsworth council coupled with Mayor Khan’s fury raises another nontrivial 
question pertaining to Grenfell: who now governs London? Taking inspiration from Freeland’s 
(2012) glimpse into contemporary ‘plutocrats’ and the new global super-rich, Atkinson et al (2017) 
define London as the archetypal plutocratic city: one where the sheer money-power of super-rich 
individuals and corporate dynasties is not only transforming London’s built environment and social 
and cultural landscapes, but also exerting influence over political decision-making in distinctly 
pronounced ways. Indeed fuelled by feverishly high-pitched corporate-speak and ever under the 
influence of The City, democratically representative institutions from national government to the 
Mayor and inner city borough authorities now seem to perform akin to a ‘chamber orchestra’, 
harmonizing conditions which are conducive for attracting plutocratic capital and the conservation 
of late capitalism (Atkinson et al 2017). The result is that London’s political regime appears to 
veer between neurosis and awe-inspired seduction in legitimizing a seemingly unrestricted 
access of plutocratic wealth as the ‘objectives of city success have come to be identified and 
aligned with the presence of wealth elites while wider goals, of access to essential resources for 
citizens, have withered’ (ibid, 179)31. Joe Delaney, a resident from the Barandon Walk finger 
block adjacent to Grenfell Tower, seemed acutely conscious of such priorities when describing 
how, just as the streets nearby began to witness investment, socioeconomic conditions in the 
Lancaster West Estate worsened revealing ‘a direct relationship between gentrification and the 
level of services the council provides to social housing tenants’ (Delaney; in Platt 2017).  
 
Nevertheless, surely there are limits to how far plutocratic modes of ‘representative government’ 
can insulate elected politicians from scrutiny and public ire. Grenfell may well be one significant 
moment in revealing these restrictions. Recall a back-footed Prime Minister after her first visit; her 
fulsome apology in Parliament a week later for ‘a failure of the state, local and national, when 
people needed it the most’ in the hours immediately after the fire (Kentish 2017b); and the 
eventual resignations of the RBKC leadership. The gravity of the fire and obvious shortcomings in 
the institutional response prompted Mrs May on 22 June to announce in Parliament a judge-led 
public inquiry into the fire. A week later she revealed that this Grenfell Tower Inquiry would be 
Chaired by Sir Martin Moore-Bick, a retired commercial court judge. While surely respected within 
the legal profession, many within the Grenfell local community became alarmed by his early 
admission that the inquiry would be limited to the technical causes of the fire and not consider 
wider contextual questions such as social housing maintenance (Sherwood 2017a). Prior to 
commencement of the inquiry, 330 submissions were sent by a variety of individuals, community 
groups, campaigners, professional bodies, politicians and faith leaders. Notable among these was 
Justice4Grenfell registering apprehension about the panel’s ‘unrepresentative and non-diverse 
make-up’ and that ‘the causes of the disaster need to be tracked to those at the highest level of 
central government, and not restricted to those at local authority level, the KCTMO, the 
contractors and the subcontractors’ (Pasha-Robinson 2017b). Justice4Grenfell was also anxious 
about how Sir Martin had earlier presided over a social housing case whose decision, in the 
words of the victim’s solicitor, set ‘a terrible precedent for local authorities to engage in social 
cleansing on a mass scale’: a decision later overturned by the Supreme Court (Blagrove 2017).  
 
In view of which the Prime Minister may be forced to acknowledge that ‘state failure’ has not been 
strictly limited to the hours immediately after the fire. For Grenfell is proving to become a deeply 
politicizing moment (Moore, 2017b). The inquiry itself opened on 14 September 2017 in the 
Grand Connaught Rooms, central London. Many Grenfell residents and representatives gathered 
outside while Chair Moore-Bick was accused of displaying disrespect to the survivors by refusing 
to answer a question from their legal representative, Michael Mansfield, QC (Adjoa Parker, 2017). 
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At the Inquiry’s initial procedural hearing in December, justice campaign group, Inquest, urged 
that a panel representative of the community join Moore-Bick ‘without which the inquiry will be 
flawed and will fail those seeking the truth and justice they deserve’ (Bowcott and Gentleman, 
2017b). Replying two weeks later, Mrs May insisted that the ‘probe’ already had ‘the necessary 
expertise to undertake its work’; a decision described by Inquest director, Deborah Coles, as 
‘disgraceful and wrong-headed [and] which sends a message out to the bereaved and survivors 
that their voices have still not been listened to’ (Roberts 2017). And early in 2018 it was revealed 
that KPMG – that standard bearer for plutocratic ‘accountancy governance’ (Merrifield, 2014) – 
had been contracted to audit the Grenfell Tower Inquiry: this while simultaneously auditing the 
RBKC council, the Rydon Group which undertook the Grenfell Tower renovation, and Celotex 
which provided the defective cladding. Given these very particular circumstances, it is truly 
staggering that those holding the highest office saw it befitting that the Inquiry be audited by this 
global corporate giant, which itself at least had the politesse to step down from its role before a 
petition which was on its way to Theresa May would force her hand on a decision (Taylor 2018).    
 
In May 2018, just prior to the Commemorative Hearings32 and the evidential hearings of Phase 
One of the Inquiry – which began in June 2018 and is scheduled to examine the night of the fire 
and the emergency response – the Prime Minister finally acquiesced to concerted community 
pressure. Following several meetings with bereaved relatives and a petition signed by over 
156,000 people and backed by grime artist Stormzy, Mrs May agreed for two additional panel 
members with the requisite local cultural and community expertise to join Sir Moore-Bick for 
Phase Two of the Inquiry, which is scheduled for December 2018 and will examine the period 
leading up to the fire and decisions relating to the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower (Booth 2018c). 
To have secured local representation is a significant democratic achievement by the Grenfell 
community. That it required to be fought for so doggedly only serves to cast further shame on the 
plutocratic state. Moreover, as outlined by Deborah Coles of Inquest, ‘it is disappointing that it is 
not for both phases of the inquiry...[for] a diverse panel can help to provide some legitimacy that 
the inquiry has lacked’ (cited in Kennedy 2018b). The early stages of the Inquiry revealed several 
crucial issues which demand clarification and perhaps a corporate or institutional response, 
including: a charge that the smoke ventilation system at Grenfell Tower was reported to have 
failed eight days before the fatal blaze and that a proposal to repair it for £1,800 was ignored 
(Booth 2018d); that while the RBKC and the KCTMO undertook a refurbishment to install highly 
inflammable cladding ‘with public funds paid to an array of contractors and sub-contractors’, none 
of these bodies has ‘yet to take any responsibility for what happened’ (Danny Friedman, QC, 
representing survivors and the bereaved; cited in Boycott 2018); and controversies relating to the 
decision by fire-fighters to retain the ‘stay put’ policy well after control over the blaze appeared to 
have been lost: firefighters rescued all remaining residents up to the 10th floor, but none got 
higher than the 20th floor while only two people escaped from the highest two floors33 (Mendick et 
al 2018; Dearden 2018; Doward 2018; O’Hagan 201834). 
 
Grenfell is an atrocity for which the institutions of government in Parliament and in Kensington 
and Chelsea alongside certain private contractors must be held to account. It is imperative that 
the Grenfell Tower Inquiry be unrestricted and forensic. To be sure it will be a long and arduous 
process for many people who are forced to recall unimaginably painful experiences. But it is also 
to be hoped that the Inquiry is one where the conventionally ascetic disposition of an English legal 
establishment can reveal the due diligence alongside the emotional intelligence to deliver justice: 
it cannot resort to protecting itself or the national-London plutocratic elite (Adjoa Parker 2017). 
The Grenfell and Lancaster West community have shown remarkable grace in articulating their 
righteous indignation while campaigning for justice amid a succession of crass decisions that 
have been delivered at them by the plutocracy: here we can cite the initial demonstrations which 
concluded with impromptu speeches and conversations; the silent marches on the 14th of every 
month; and their dignified presence at the six month commemoration in St Paul’s Cathedral; and 
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further dignity in being the target of deeply shameful vilification that has been placed on social 
media and which is surely fueled by the hate-speech of ‘nativist politicians’ and England’s 
thoroughly degraded right-wing press (Madden 2017). It is time the people of Grenfell and the 
Lancaster West Estate and their friends are treated with the honor that befits them and the 
memory of their lost loved ones. Recalling the quotation from Andrew Sayer at the beginning of 
this final section, is also high time to renounce the current restrictions placed upon democracy 
and the provision of decent housing by a plutocratic mode of local and national level government.   
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Notes 
                                                 
1 This was subsequently confirmed to be 72.  
 
2 “Statement Re Grenfell Tower”, London’s Air Ambulance on 15 June 2017  
https://londonsairambulance.co.uk/our-service/news/2017/06/statement-re-grenfell-tower 
 
3 TMO here refers to the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO). 
 
4 Tragically, subsequent reports confirmed that Mr Chellat’s family died in the fire (Kennedy 2017b). 
 
5 The claims about the lack of a council ‘presence’ are disputed in a lengthy essay by Andrew O’Hagan 
(2018) in the London Review of Books, which also reports that at 1100, the Kensington and Chelsea 
Council sent ten housing officers to begin the search for accommodation. 
   
6 At the time of writing, a spokesman for RBKC claimed it had spent £235m on securing 307 properties to 
help rehouse people affected by the fire; and that, of the 203 households requiring rehousing, 134 have a 
new permanent home, while 52 are in temporary and 15 in emergency accommodation (Batty 2018). 
 
7 The ex-footballer, David Beckham, and a host of hedge fund billionaires live in the stucco mansions of 
Notting Hill, while Roman Abramovich, the current Chairman of Chelsea FC who pocketed billions of dollars 
following the privatization of Russia’s state assets, owns a £125m house in Kensington Palace Gardens. 
 
8 While life expectancy in Kensington and Chelsea is the highest in the UK it is extremely uneven. In the 
Hans Town ward, near the world-renowned Harrods store, a man can expect to live up to 94; in Golborne 
ward (just north of Grenfell) the average life-span for a man is 72, a reduction of six years since 2010 (Dent 
Coad 2017b). 
 
9 As one of the first benevolent housing associations, The Peabody Trust was established in the 1860s by 
philanthropist George Peabody, and currently rents about 20,000 homes across London (Meek 2015). 
 
10 The two have since merged. 
  
11 In Kensington and Chelsea the average rent is 96 per cent of the average income (Gapper 2017) thereby 
coming in at £9,840 per month.  
 
12 The highest rate is in Labour-controlled Newham with 1,706 in September 2017, Kensington and Chelsea 
having 1,619 (Watt 2018). And thanks to Paul Watt for highlighting this to me. 
 
13 http://www.savethesuttonestate.co.uk/ 
 
14 Housing associations never call it ‘profit’. 
 
15 The second highest in London after Westminster with 11,457 or 9.3 per cent, and all part of over £122 
billion worth of property in England and Wales held via companies registered in secrecy jurisdictions 
(Transparency International 2015). 
 
16 In terms of the national political map, the Royal Borough forms all of one constituency, Kensington, with 
Chelsea included in the Chelsea and Fulham constituency, where the Conservative, Greg Hands, was re-
elected.  
 
17 These savings are believed to have emerged following an ‘urgent nudge email’ sent by the KCTMO 
project manager to Artelia, its French-based consultancy firm, which outlined how, with respect to cladding, 
‘We need good costs for Councillor Feilding-Mellen and the planner tomorrow at 8.45am!’: Rock Feilding-
Mellen being the ex-chair of the RBKC housing committee and former Deputy Leader (Booth and Grierson 
2017).  
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18 It is worth noting that, during its refurbishment, building inspectors visited Grenfell Tower sixteen times, 
signing it off as ‘compliant with government fire safety guidance despite it being fitted with combustible 
plastic core cladding panels’ (Booth 2018a).  
 
19 http://www.kctmo.org.uk/sub/about-us/38/our-mission 
 
20 Thereby rendering it the largest TMO in the UK.  
 
21 The KCTMO is the only TMO that is also an arm’s length management organization (ALMO). And 
although it was created in 1994 under the then Conservative Government’s Housing (Right to Manage) 
Regulations, it was done so under corporate law and, as an ALMO is thereby exempt from Freedom of 
Information requests (ASH 2017).   
 
22 Daffarn revealed this a film by Anthony Wilks, entitled Grenfell: The End of an Experiment?, which 
accompanied the online publication of O’Hagan’s paper in London Review of Books: see:  
https://www.lrb.co.uk/v40/n11/andrew-ohagan/the-tower#group-view-film-dBLTvrFj7z 
 
23 It is notable how Grenfell Tower was deleted from the websites of several companies involved, many of 
which list the other projects they have worked on as case studies intended to demonstrate excellence 
(Davies 2017). 
 
24 Furthermore, The Audit Commission, which had responsibility for scrutinizing local authority contracts, 
was abolished in 2015, its functions transferred to the voluntary and private sectors (Tucker 2017b). 
 
25 In the ten weeks after Grenfell, it was identified that 262 tall residential towers across England had similar 
combustible cladding panels, including 161 social housing blocks and 26 student halls of residence (Booth 
et al 2017). 
 
26 Of all the spending cuts introduced by the Thatcher government in its first term, three-quarters came from 
the housing budget (Meek 2015).  
 
27 A process dependent upon a majority of council tenants voting in favour but one which also saw 
considerable deception in terms of misinformation alongside outright threat and coercion waged upon 
tenants who favoured continued council ownership (Meek 2015). 
 
28 By 2011, for the first time since 1971, more London households were living in the private rented sector 
(25 per cent), and Shelter has estimated that private renting will swell to 41 per cent by 2025 (London 
Assembly Housing and Regeneration Committee 2013, 13; in Watt and Minton 2016).  
 
29 Relating to arrangements between planning authorities and private developers under ‘Section 106’ to 
secure agreed proportions of units in new developments as social or ‘affordable’ housing (Edwards 2016). 
 
30 This PwC rating on London’s quality of life is bafflingly at odds with other studies identifying quality of life 
to be high in cities quite different from London, such as Vancouver and Sydney as well as European ones 
like Amsterdam and Stockholm: ones which are less dependent on finance, more equal and frankly more 
‘public’.  
 
31 While it might be expected for Boris Johnson, Conservative Mayor from 2008 to 2016, to be an 
unabashed cheerleader for the ‘heroic contribution’ made to London by the super-rich (Atkinson et al 2017: 
187), his predecessor, the left-leaning Ken Livingstone, is also reported to have been ‘in thrall to the titans 
of London’s property world’ (Jenkins 2016; Massey 2007).  
 
32 This was a highly emotive week of hearings where friends and relatives paid tribute to the 72 people who 
died in the fire.  
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33 Amid claims that senior firefighters were under-prepared for the events of June 14 2017, it is worth noting 
that while all fire authorities were officially advised to train key staff to determine when they should abandon 
the ‘stay-put’ policy for residents in burning tower blocks three years before the Grenfell tragedy, the 
training of the London fire brigade has been outsourced since 2012 to a private contractor, Babcock 
International: a process that itself is under scrutiny vis-a-vis the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (Doward 2018). 
 
34 Andrew O’Hagan’s essay has itself generated considerable controversy, not least for its purported 
misrepresentation of details provided to him by Grenfell survivors and families, his sympathetic account of 
the RBKC leadership, including Paget-Brown and Feilding-Mellen (Rustin 2018), and also his claim that ‘the 
firefighting operation at Grenfell was a huge and dramatic failure, though nobody wanted to say so’ 
(O’Hagan 2018, 16).  
 
 
